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A Model Statute for the Development of Oil and
Gas Interests Held Under Joint Ownership
Like many other interests in property, the oil and gas
rights in a single tract of land are often held by more than one
person. Concurrent ownership of oil and gas rights can take the
form of "tenancy in common, joint tenancy, tenancy by entirety,
coparcenary, community property and partnership property."'
Because cotenants2 simultaneously have "equal rights in the
,~
often arise when
possession and use" of the p r ~ p e r t y conflicts
one cotenant wants to develop the resources but another does
not. This Comment will discuss whether a cotenant of a n oil
and gas mineral interest has the right to explore, develop, or
otherwise exploit the resources without the consent of the other
~otenants.~
States follow one of two rules when confronted with this
issue. The majority rule does not require cotenant consent,
while the minority rule does to varying degrees. Part I of this
Comment introduces the English statutes that form the foundation for both rules. Part I1 discusses the majority rule by looking a t case law and statutory law of states that follow this rule.
Part I11 then analyzes the minority rule. Part IV presents a n
administrative scheme that represents a compromise between
the two rules in an effort to equitably protect cotenants holding
either majority or minority interests.
AND THE RULE OF ACCOUNTING
I. THE LAW AGAINSTWASTE

Two English statutes provide the framework within which
states have developed their current laws concerning the rights
cotenants enjoy to independently develop the common property.
Indeed, "the lack of uniformity in the law among the states [in
KUNIZ, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 8 5.1 (1987).
1. 1 EUGENE
2. Although the various forms of co-ownership differ in many respects, both
in theory and practical effect, the term "cotenants" will be used in this Comment
to describe "any situation in which two or more persons simultaneously may assert
interests-socially-enforced claims-referable to an item of realty." JOHNE. CRIBBET
ET AL., CASESAND M A T E R ~ L s ON PROPEMY 322 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Id.
4. This Comment discusses the attributes of joint ownership only tangentially. For a general discussion of joint ownership, see 4A RICHARD
R. POWELL,
THE LAWOF REAL PROPEMY
chs. 49-52 (1991).
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this area] can best be described in the light of the varying
interpretation of [these] statutes or their contemporary counterpart~."~

A. The Law Against Waste
The Statute of Westminster IIP6passed in 1285, is the first
codified expression of the law against waste. Prior to this statute, "there was no action for waste in favor of one cotenant
against another cotenant."? The statute provided that, 'Whereas two or more do hold Wood, Turf-land, or Fishing, or other
such thing in common, . . . and some of them do Waste against
the Minds of the other, an Action may lie by a Writ of Waste."'
In an action for waste, the statute provided a choice of two
remedies. First, the land could be partitioned and "the Part
wasted shall be assigned" to the defendant.g Second, the defendant could be restrained and ordered "to take nothing from
henceforth in the [land] . . . but as his Partners will take."1°
Many states have adopted similar statutes. For example,
Alaska provides the following:
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, or tenant in common of
real property commits waste on the property, a person injured
by the waste may bring an action for damages for the injury.
In an action for waste there may be judgment for treble damages. Where the plaintiff has a reversionary interest and the
injury due to waste equals or exceeds the value of the interest
held by the one committing the waste, or the waste is committed with malice, judgment may be for forfeiture of the estate
and eviction."

Alaska's statute, like most other state statutes,12does not specifically define the term "waste." Consequently, the term must
be defined by the state courts. The Alaska courts have stated
5. 1 KUNTZ,supra note 1, § 5.2.
6. Statute of Westminster 11, 1285, 13 Edw., ch. 22 (Eng.).

supra note 1, 8 5.2.
7. 1 KUN~Z,
8. 13 Edw., ch. 22 (emphasis added) (spelling modernized).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. ALASKA STAT.$ 09.45.740 (1983).
12. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $ 5307.21 (Anderson 1989) ("One coparcener
may maintain an action of waste against another coparcener."); WYO. STAT.$ 1-32119 (1977) ("One (1) parcener may maintain an adion of waste against another,
but no parcener shall possess any privileges over another in any election, division,
partition or matter to be made or done concerning lands which have descended.").
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that waste occurs when a cotenant engages in conduct that
either results in physical damage to the land or substantial
diminution in value of the common property.13
Because the various state jurisdictions must individually
define "waste," it is not surprising that a lack of uniformity
exists in determining whether development of oil and gas interests by one cotenant without the consent of the other cotenants
constitutes "waste." As will be discussed in detail, a majority of
states hold that such conduct does not constitute waste;14
however, a minority of states maintain that a nonconsenting
cotenant may have an action for waste against a cotenant's
development.l5

B. The Rule of Accounting
Like the law of waste, the rule requiring a cotenant to
account t o fellow cotenants for all profits and rents received
from the common property had its genesis in early English
legislation. The rule of accounting was established in 1705 by
the Statute of Anne," which reads as follows:
[Alctions of account shall and may be brought and maintained . . . by one joint tenant, and tenant in common, his
executors and administrators, against the other, as bailiff for
receiving more than comes to his just share or proportion . . . .I7
The rule giving a cotenant the right t o seek an accounting has
been statutorily adopted in most states. For example,
Arkansas's ''Ftight of cotenants t o accountingyystatute reads as
follows:
(a) When any joint tenant, tenant in common, or coparcener in any real estate, or any interest therein, shall take, use,
or have the profits and benefits thereof in greater proportion
than his interest therein, that person, or his executor or administrator, shall account' therefor to his cotenant or
cotenants, jointly or severally.
(b) Joint tenants, tenants in common, and coparceners in
any real or personal estate may maintain civil actions against

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983).
See i f i a part 11.
See i f i a part 111.
1 KUNTZ,supra note 1, 8 5.2.
Statute of Anne, 1705, 4 h e , ch. 16, 8 27 (Eng.) (spelling modernized).
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their cotenants who receive as bailiffs more than their due
proportion of the benefits of the estate.18

Other states have similar statutes.lg Thus, depending on the
jurisdiction, the interaction of the law against waste and the
rule of accounting provides a cotenant with two possible remedies when another cotenant extracts oil and gas. If extraction of
the resources without consent is considered waste, the cotenant
can seek an injunction to stop the activity and obtain damages.
Alternatively, the extracting cotenant may be able t o continue
the venture, but other cotenants may bring suit seeking an
accounting for any profits over his proportional share.20

.

18. ARK. CODEANN. 8 18-60-101 (Michie 1987). However, in Arkansas, the
right to an accounting does not apply to the tenancy by the entirety of a husband
and wife. See Wood v. Wright, 386 S.W.2d 248 (Ark. 1965). Also, for a discussion
of the interesting issue of the interaction between a cotenant making improvements
on the land and the right to accounting by the other cotenants, see Cocke v.
Clausen, 55 S.W. 846 (Ark. 1900).
19. For a sampling of other state statutes, see ALA. CODE8 6-7-40 (1985) ("A
joint tenant, tenant in common, or tenant in coparcenary may commence an action
against his cotenant or coparcener, or personal representative for receiving more
than his lawful proportion."); ALASKA STAT.8 34.15.120 (1990) ("A tenant in common may maintain an action against a cotenant for receiving more than the fair
share of the rents and profits of the estates owned by them in common."); OHIO
REV. CODEANN. 8 5307.21 (Anderson 1991) ("One tenant in common, or coparcener, may recover from another tenant in common, or coparcener[,] his share of
rents and profits received by such tenant in common or coparcener from the estate,
according to the justice and equity of the case."); WYO. STAT. 8 1-32-119 (1977)
("One (1) tenant in common or coparcener may recover from another his share of
rents and profits received by the tenant in common or coparcener from the estate.").
20. It should be noted here, as will be shown later, that the rule requiring a
cotenant to account to other cotenants is essentially followed in both the majority
and minority jurisdictions. Consequently, the real issue is whether the
nonconsenting cotenant has one or two remedies. Generally, he will always be able
to force an accounting, but he may also have the right to enjoin the activity and
seek damages if the jurisdiction considers extraction without consent of the other
cotenants waste.
It should also be mentioned that the rule of waste applies uniformly in all
jurisdictions in some situations. For example, in all jurisdictions, "operations that
result in permanent damage to the land when such operations are not necessary to
the extraction of minerals from the same land" are considered waste, whether
performed by a cotenant or someone acting under his direction. 1 KUNTZ, supra
note 1, 8 5.2. Therefore, this Comment is limited to the question of whether extraction of the oil and gas is considered waste when those operations are legitimate and necessary to the development and extraction of the resources.
This is also a good place to mention what this Comment will not cover in any
great detail. First, the rules and methods which individual jurisdictions have
adopted to define and govern accounting actions will not be arrayed or elaborated
upon. The various methods used are vast and often complex enough to serve as

.
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These two statutes, the law against waste and the rule of
accounting, form the framework for the majority and minority
rules which will now be discussed in detail.21 Case law and
statutes of states following each rule will be presented, emphasizing the rationale used by the respective states in choosing
one rule over the other.
OIL AND GAS WITHOUT
CONSENT:
11. THERIGHTTO EXTRACT
THEMAJORITYRULE

A. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen and the Majority Rule
The seminal case describing the majority rule arises out of
an Oklahoma fact situation. In Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v.
Allen owned a one-tenth interest in the oil and gas
underlying an expansive tract of land. Her cotenants and owners of the other nine-tenths interest in the oil and gas began
developing and producing the resources. Allen did not consent
to the extraction and sued, claiming that because of her
nonconsent the operators were trespassers and liable for conversion.23
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. It first recognized that Allen
and the defendants were indeed tenants in common and as
such "may make such reasonable use of the common property
as is necessary t o enjoy the benefit and value of such ownerindividual paper topics themselves. For a nice overview of some of the major principles involved in accounting actions, see Howard R. Williams, The Effect of Concurrent Interests on Oil and Gas Transactions, 34 TEX.L. REV. 519, 523-34 (1956).
Furthermore, concurrent owners may use any remedy available to other joint
owners of other property interests, other than the two listed above (suit in damages for waste and accounting). A concurrent owner may also seek partition, equitable partition, and development and management under a receiver. But these
remedies are generally not economically feasible. Because these remedies are difflcult to apply to oil and gas interests, this Comment will focus on the two remedies
listed earlier. For more information on other remedies available, see Ernest E.
Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas Lands Burdened
with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEX. L. REV. 129, 136-50 (1964); 'Williams,
supra, at 534-49.
21. It should be mentioned that all states but one have these two rules as
part of their common law or statutory law, derived from English jurisprudence.
The exception, of course, is Louisiana, whose law grew out of the French Civil
Code. "In Louisiana, the Statutes of Westminster 11 and Anne are not part of the
traditional law, nor have counterparts of such statutes been enacted." 1 KUNTZ,
supra note 1, 8 5.4. That is not to say that Louisiana does not have similar doctrines; it does. These doctrines are simply founded on different traditions. See infia
part 1II.A.
22. 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924).
23. Id. at 569-70.
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ship."24The court then implicitly ruled that the extraction of
oil and gas is not considered waste. It stated that an oil and
gas interest "can only be enjoyed by removing the products
thereof" and therefore, the "extraction of oil from an oil well
[is] the use and not the destruction of the estate."25The court
then stated what is now the majority rule: "This being true (the
fact that extraction of oil is not waste), a tenant in common,
without the consent of his cotenant, has the right to develop
and operate the common property for oil and gas and for that
purpose may drill wells and erect necessary plants."26
The rationale the court used t o support the right t o extract
oil and gas without receiving the consent of cotenants was
based primarily on circumstances potentially arising out of the
law of capture. In describing the law of capture, the court
wrote that oil, as a "fugitive substance," is always in danger of
being "drained from the land by [a] well on adjoining propert ~ . " ' In
~ order to protect his interest, the cotenant must act
"promptly" before the oil is taken, and "if a cotenant owning a
small interest in the land had to give his consent" before the
other cotenants could act, the nonconsenting cotenant "could
arbitrarily destroy the valuable quality of the land.'a8 However, the court offered no further rationale for why the cotenants
in Prairie Oil had the right to develop and produce the minerals where there was no evidence that the oil was being drained
or in danger of being drained.
Although the extraction of oil and gas without the consent
of all cotenants is not considered waste in Oklah0ma,2~the

24. Id. at 571.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id. The court did add that this rule does have a limitation: the cotenant
may not "exclude his cotenant from exercising the same rights and privileges." Id.
27. Id. (quoting Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912).
28. Id. (quoting Burnham, 147 S.W. at 335). The same rationale is expressed
in a California case. The California Supreme Court held that "it is not waste for a
cotenant to go upon the land and produce oil" even without the consent of the
other cotenants. DabneyJohnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237, 246 (Cal.
1935). The court considered the taking of oil and gas to be using the estate rather
than destroying it. "This principle," the court stated, "is of special importance in
regard to fugacious substances, which may be lost entirely through drilling operations on other lands if the owners do not diligently seek to reduce them to possession." Id.; cf. McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912) ("[Olwing to the fugacious
nature of oil and gas, . . . it is peculiarly necessary that cotenants should not be
unduly restricted in the enjoyment of such properties.").
29. The rule applied in Prairie Oil was already well established in Oklahoma

13171

OIL AND GAS RIGHTS

1323

nonconsenting cotenant does have the right to force the producing cotenant to account for all profits obtained. This duty to
account is generally established by statuteS0and is specifically
applied to oil and gas extraction by case law.31
The rule established in Prairie Oil has had precedential
influence in other states that have considered this issue. In
1976, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided for the first time
whether it would require consent from nondeveloping cotenants
when another cotenant desired t o develop jointly held oil and
gas rights. In Slade u. Rudman Resources, Inc.,S2 plaintiffs
owned a one-half interest both in the surface and in the minerals in the property at issue. Plaintiffs sued their cotenants
(owners of the remaining one-half interest), seeking a declaratory judgment that the cotenants "have no rights of. . . use in
or to the subject real property without [plaintiffs'] consent."33
The court initially established the rule that "a grant of
minerals conveys, by implication, the rights of ingress and
egress, and possession of the surface necessary to the use and
However, the issue of
enjoyment of the estate conveyed.7734
whether this right could be exercised without consent of coowners was a "question of first impression.'735After being confronted with both the majority and minority rules, the court
adopted "the prevailing [majority] rule because it makes
sense."36 Therefore, in Georgia, "a co-tenant has . . . the right
case law. In Moody v. Wagner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
each tenant in common has the right to enter upon the common premises
and explore and develop the same for oil and gas and to produce such
products from the premises, provided however, that a cotenant cannot
exclude his cotenant from exercising the same right with reference to the
common property.
Moody v. Wagner, 23 P.2d 633, 635 (Okla. 1933). However, Prairie Oil is important
for its explicit language that this right is fully available whether or not the other
cotenant or cotenants consent.
30. "A joint tenant, or tenant in common, or tenant in coparcenary, may
maintain an action against his wtenant or coparcener, or their personal representatives, for receiving more than his just proportion of the rents and profits." OKLA.
STAT.ANN. tit. 41, § 21 (West 1986). For more information on co-ownership in
Oklahoma, see Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Co-ownership of Property in Oklahoma,
27 OKLA.L. REV. 585 (1974).
31. See Prairie Oil, 2 F.2d at 573; Moody, 23 P.2d at 635-36; Airington v.
Airington, 192 P. 689, 690 (Okla. 1920).
32. 230 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. 1976).
33. Id. at 285.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 286.
36. Id. The court does not reveal exactly why the majority view "made sense."
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to enter and mine the common property, without the consent of
his co-tenants, but subject to his accounting to the other cotenants for their respective share^."^' Therefore, simply because it "made sense," the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the
majority view, limiting the remedy a nonconsenting cotenant
has to a forced a~counting.~'
In Davis v. B ~ r d a, Missouri
~ ~
court of appeals was given
the task of determining whether development of a mineral
interest held in co-ownership, without the consent of other
cotenants, constituted "waste" under the Missouri statutes.
Like Slade u. Rudman Resources in Georgia,"' this issue was
one of first impression in Missouri? In Davis, plaintiffs
sought to enjoin their cotenant defendants from extracting
The primary premise of
minerals from the common e ~ t a t e . ' ~
their arguments was that extraction of minerals from jointly
owned property constituted waste.
Missouri statutory law establishes that if "a tenant in
common, joint tenant or parcener commit waste, he shall be
liable to his cotenants, jointly or severally, for damages."43
The court recognized that "two distinct rules" exist in relation
to the issue of development of mineral interests without consent of other cotenants: one that considers such activity waste
and another that does not.'* In determining which rule to follow, the court looked to neighboring jurisdictions, namely OklaAfter a "thorough study of the applicah ~ m and
a ~ Kansas.46
~

I t probably made sense because it was the right thing to do. Nevertheless, no
other rationale is given.
37. Id.
38. See GA. CODEANN. § 23-2-70 (Harrison 1982) ("Equity jurisdiction over
matters of account shall extend to: . . . (5) Accounts between partners or tenants
in common . . . .").
39. 185 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
40. 230 S.E.2d a t 286; see supm note 35 and accompanying text.
41. Concerning the plaintiff's claim that a tenant in common "may prevent
the mining of mineral lands by refusing to join his cotenant in the enterprise," the
court wrote that "[wle find no case in Missouri which we think is clearly in point
and none has been cited that is decisive of this question." Dauis, 185 S.W.2d at
867.
42. Although this case deals with hard minerals, it nonetheless equally applies to oil and gas.
43. Mo.ANN. STAT.8 537.460 (Vernon 1988).
44. Davis, 185 S.W.2d at 867.
45. Id. at 868 (citing Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.
1924)).
46. Id. (citing Compton v. People's Gas Co., 89 P. 1039 (Kan. 1907)). Kansas,
like Oklahoma, follows the majority rule allowing cotenants to explore and extract
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ble law," the court found that acting without the consent of
cotenants did not constitute "waste under the waste statute in
Missouri" and therefore an action for damages or an injunction
was not a~ailable.~'
One judge, concurring in the judgment, gave an often-used
rationale for the majority rule. He wrote, "[Ilf the owner of onehalf interest in mining land can prevent the owners of the
other half. . . from mining . . . the owner of a thousandth interest can do likewise; the position of plaintiff is thus capable
of reduction to absurdity."48 Therefore, in Missouri, like the

oil and gas from the common property without the consent of the other cotenants.
In Krug v. Krug, 618 P.2d 323 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980), this rule was strictly applied.
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Krug were the producing cotenants and the defendant was the nonconsenting co-owner. The plaintiffs, who owned a nine-elevenths
interest in the minerals under a half-section of land, sought to compel their lessees
and Krug (who owned the remaining two-elevenths interest) to explore and drill for
oil under the tract. Id. at 324. The cause of the suit was Krug's unwillingness to
work with plaintiff's lessees and the fact that a neighboring property was "presumably draining the pool thought to be under the land in question." Id.
The court, without much discussion, reiterated the Kansas rule that cotenants
have the right to explore and drill "even without [the] consent" of other cotenants.
Id. at 325 (citing Compton, 89 P. 1039). Although not stated explicitly, it appears
that the Kansas courts also do not consider such activity "waste" on the property
and therefore, the cotenant has no injunctive or damages remedy.
The court then stated the rule that a nonconsenting cotenant has the remedy
to seek an accounting. Id. at 325-26. The right to recover rents and profits is also
found at KAN. STAT.ANN. $ 58-2522 (1992), which reads, "A joint tenant, or tenant
in common, or tenant in coparcenary, may maintain an action against his or her
cotenant or coparcener or their personal representatives, for receiving more than
his or her just proportion of the rents and profits." It is interesting to note that
the rule of accounting can be used to require a nonconsenting cotenant to aid in
the payment of production costs. The general rule of accounting is that the
nonconsenting cotenant is allowed a percentage of the profits only after accounting
to the producer for a "proportionate share of the expense of drilling, production,
and, if need be, marketing." Krug, 618 P.2d at 325. However, in Kansas, the nonconsenting cotenant must account for expenses only if there is production. Therefore, if a cotenant drills two holes, and the fwst is a producer and the second a
dry hole, a nonconsenting cotenant is only required to pay drilling expenses on the
first hole. Id. at 325-26; see also Davis v. Sherman, 86 P.2d 490 (Kan. 1939).
47. Davis, 185 S.W.2d at 869. In establishing this rule, the court wrote,
From a thorough study of the applicable law and the many cases cited
we find that both the rules . . . are supported by respectable authorities.
However, the greater weight of authority seems to hold that a tenant in
common commits no wrong in entering upon the common property for the
purpose of carrying on mining operations in the usual way and therefore
cannot be held to be a trespasser; and that the removal of ore without
willful injury to the common property or unnecessary destruction caused
by negligence or unskillfulness does not constitute waste.
Id.
48. Id. (Blair, J., concurring in the judgment); cf Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp.
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other states discussed, a cotenant has the right to develop the
mineral estate without the consent of the other cotenants, subject only t o the rule requiring accounting.

B. An Evaluation of the Majority Rule
With the exception of four states:' all sigmficant oil producing states follow the majority rule that "a cotenant in the
fee may enter to explore for and produce oil and gas without
consent of his cot en ant^."^^ There appear to be three primary
rationales used to substantiate this rule. First, because of the
fugitive nature of oil and gas, and the law of capture, it is necessary t o allow each cotenant the complete right to extract the
oil o r gas in order to protect it from neighboring lands that may
dip into the same ~001.~'
Second, because the oil and gas must
be removed to be enjoyed, exploration and removal of the resources does not constitute waste or destruction of the interest
but rather the "use" of the interest.52And third, requiring consent from all cotenants would allow one cotenant with a small
interest to block the interests of the others with larger interests; this seems to be inequitable or even irrational."

v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 1935) ("A single cotenant should not be in a
position to prevent beneficial utilization of the mineral estate by the other
cotenants.").
49. See infra part 111.
50. 1 KUN'IZ,supra note 1, Q 5.3 (citing Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2
F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924)). For a small sampling of other states following this rule,
see the following:
Kentucky: Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1955) (Because. the corporation was a cotenant, it "was not a trespasser"
when it drilled and removed oil "as it had the right to drill on the commonly
owned property without the consent of appellee.").
Montana: Hochsprung v. Stevenson, 266 P. 406, 409 (Mont. 1928) (In a cotenancy, "each of the cotenants may work [the property] without being guilty of
waste.").
Pennsylvania: McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912) (The defendant was
allowed to extract oil without the consent of the plaintiff co-owner, but was required to account.).
Texas: Rosse v. Northern Pump Co., 353 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) ("A
tenant in common has the right to occupy the entire joint property [without consent] but if he removes oil or gas he must account to the co-tenant for the value
of the proportionate shares of the oil and gas . . . .").
Utah: Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991).
51. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
52. See 1 K U m , supra note 1, Q 5.3; supra notes 25, 47 and accompanying
text.
53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Few would argue against the first rationale. If the land is
being drained by operations on neighboring lands, any cotenant
should be allowed to, and perhaps has a duty to, prevent the
drainage. Also, it is economically irrational that a cotenant
would attempt to stop another cotenant who was extracting the
oil and gas because it was being drained by a neighboring
pump. Furthermore, because the subject property is rarely
being drained in these cases, if the majority rule were limited
t o drainage fad situations, it would have a very limited application.
The second rationale is also defensible. Having a mineral
interest is arguably worthless unless the mineral can be developed. But in the oil and gas context this is not entirely true.
Because of their speculative value, oil interests and leases can
If a cotenant would
be very valuable before e~ploration.~~
rather wait and sell his interest before it is determined whether oil exists, or how much exists, in the property, why not allow
him the right to stop development? Both cotenants own their
interests in fee, so why should development always take precedence over resale speculative value? It is arguable that exploring for oil and determining the actual value of the interest is
waste if the speculative value of the interest is thereby diminished.
The third rationale is not so convincing. If it is irrational
or inequitable to allow a minority tenant to stop development,
is it not equally irrational or inequitable t o allow minority
tenants to develop the land when the majority would rather
wait? If oil and gas prices are anticipated to rise in the near
future, it is quite reasonable to wait and develop when profits
will be higher. Also, it may be wise to wait until explorations
on surrounding parcels of land are carried out, especially if a
cotenant is more interested in the speculative value of his mineral interest. The third rationale supports the right of a cotenant t o enjoin development as much as it supports the right of a
cotenant to develop without consent.

54. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1927); Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. 862 (Wyo. 1927). For a good discussion of the
speculative value associated with oil and gas interests, see Howard R. Williams &
Charles J. Meyers, Adverse Possession and Trespass in the Law of Oil and Gas, 29
ROCKYMTN. L. REV. 1, 43-61 (1956).

1328 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

Before this Comment continues its discussion of these
ideas,s5 the minority rule and its rationales need to be introduced. Unlike the majority-rule states, the states following the
minority rule are not entirely congruent in their application.
Much of this incongruence arises from the fact that statutory
law plays a more active role in some minority-rule states than
in majority-rule states. Because of this incongruence, and since
only four states currently follow the minority rule, each of
those states will be briefly discussed.

A. Louisiana
In Louisiana, unlike the states following the majority rule,
the right a cotenant has to extract minerals is rather restricted. The most ofi-cited Louisiana case implementing the minorit y rule is Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll.56In Carroll, the defendants (a father and son) entered into an installment contract in
which the son received a one-half interest in a plantation. The
son then leased his one-half mineral interest to the plaintiff.
The son defaulted on the installment contract, and the father
in turn sued to extinguish the contract. The lessee then
brought suit to protect its leasehold interestO5'After a finding
by the trial court that the lease was still effective:' the defendants appealed.
On appeal, the court found that the lease was not valid. It
stated, "Now the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land
has not the right to exploit the land for oil and gas without the
consent, implied or express, of his co-owner, and not having
this right himself he cannot confer it upon a le~see."~Much of
the court's rationale of this rule was based on old Roman and
French law?' "Co-owners are owners par mi et par tout, of
55. See i*a part IV.
56. 82 So. 277 (La. 1919).
57. It seems that when the lease was entered into there was no knowledge of
any oil on the property. Before the plaintiff company entered the land, oil was
found on neighboring lands and apparently the lease had "became a disadvantageous one to the defendants." Carrdl, 82 So. at 278. The trial court found that the
default had been "a mere collusive proceeding [by the defendants] to get rid of the
lease" and thus upheld the lease. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The court extensively quoted ancient Roman and French property axioms.
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part and of the whole. Neither of two co-owners has the exclusive right to any determinate part of the common property.'"'
Therefore, either co-owner has a "veto" over any other coowner's activity on the common land?'
In summary, the court rationalized its opinion based on the
fact that the defendants could oppose the drilling of a well by
the plaintiff because the land "where the well is proposed to be
bored belongs to [the defendants] as much as to the [plaintiffl,"
and neither is entitled to "exclusive possession of it."63Therefore, at the very "moment the co-owners cannot agree," the only
remedy available to either co-owner is "to demand a partiti~n.'~~
Essentially, the minority rule, as developed in Carroll,
states that because each cotenant owns a percentage of every
element of the property, neither can have exclusive control
without consent of the other. Allowing one cotenant to operate
the entire parcel, even though he only owns a portion of it,
seems to give him a greater right than justified by his intere ~ t . ~ ~
However, this restrictiveness has recently been relaxed by
statute. Prior to 1987, "unanimous consent among co-owners"
was required before development of the mineral interest could
In 1987, the Louisiana Mineral Code was amended t o
require ninety percent rather than unanimous consent? And
in 1988, the Code was again amended to its present form. Today, the Code states that a cotenant "may not conduct operations on the property subject to the servitude without the con-

See id. at 278-80. Central to much of this analysis is the idea that a co-owner
owns a quota of land rather than any specific entity. It is an overstepping of ownership for one having only a quota of land (and an abstract quota at that) to exercise on the totality of the common property. How can one exercise operations on
the entire property when he owns only a quota of it, and really only a quota in
the abstract because-absent a partition-the cotenant cannot point to any specific
entity of the property that represents his quota?
61. Id. at 278.
62. See Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and T w s Oil and
Gas Law: An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 815 (1992).
63. Carroll, 82 So. at 280.
64. Id. The court added that "[alny other doctrine would lead to armed conflict between the parties." Id.
65. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
66. Angela J. Crowder, Comment, Mineral Rights: The Requirement of Consent
Among Co-Owners, 48 LA. L. REV. 931, 933 11.13 (1988); see also Guy E. Wall,
Joint Oil and Gas Operations in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1992).
67. Wall, supra note 66, at 85.
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sent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent
interest in the servitude."68
There is a "very limited" exception to this rule,pg which
allows a cotenant t o act without the consent of the other
cotenants. A cotenant is allowed "to prevent waste or destmction or extinction" of the property by extracting the oil and gas
without the normal unanimous consent req~irement.?~
However, thus far the courts have allowed this exception only when a
neighboring property owner was draining the common property.?' Therefore, in Louisiana, a cotenant must jump through
either of two hoops to operate on the land. First, he can obtain
the consent of at least eighty percent of the other cotenants.
Or, he can operate without obtaining consent if he is preventing the destruction of the interest and can show irreparable
harm. However, it is clear that both statutory law and jurispmdence "strongly favor[] the nonconsenting co-owner."72

68. LA. REV.STAT.ANN. § 31:175 (West 1989). The statute further states that
the remaining cotenants who do not consent have "no liability for the costs of
development and operations except out of [their] share of production." Id.; see also
id. 8 31:164.
69. Crowder, supra note 66, at 938-39.
70. LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 31:176 (West 1989). In full, the statute reads as
follows:
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may act to prevent waste or the destruction or extinction of the servitude, but he cannot impose upon his coowner liability for any costs of development or operation or other costs
except out of production. He may lease or otherwise contract regarding
the full ownership of the servitude but must act at all times in good
faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude owner whose interest
is not subject to co-ownership.
Id. As the statute makes clear, no liabilities can be placed on nonconsenting owners except out of production. Thus, a cotenant acting to prevent waste should still
try to obtain consent because if the development proves to be costly and with little
return, he is stuck with all costs even though he was only attempting to protect
the property itself.
71. The seminal case in this area is United Gas Public Service Co. v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 147 So. 66 (La. 1932). Crowder writes that the
"only case to consider the matter since United Gas refused to allow one co-owner
to operate without consent where he failed to show that he would suffer irreparable injury." Crowder, supm note 66, at 939. Therefore, it appears that even though
the statute allows a cotenant to act without consent to preserve the property, he
must also show "irreparable injury"; such a judicial gloss would make it usually
very difficult to succeed. And because the developing cotenant can easily be stuck
with all liabilities of the development, see supra note 68, this exception can be a
risky one to rely on.
72. Crowder, supm note 66, at 944. For more on Louisiana oil law governing
co-ownership of oil rights, see Martin & Yeates, supra note 62, at 814-17.
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B. West Virginia
Unlike Louisiana, West Virginia does not have a statutory
scheme which explicitly states that a cotenant may not develop
the land without consent of the cotenants. However, like many
other states, West Virginia does have a statute prohibiting
waste by a cotenant.73The following question then arises: Are
operations by a cotenant, without the consent of the other
cotenants, on the common property considered waste? As previously established, a large majority of states answer no.74West
Virginia jurisprudence, to the contrary, answers yes.
t ~ ~West Virginia SuIn South Penn Oil Co. u. H a ~ g h the
preme Court held that a person holding a one-fourth interest in
the oil and gas of a tract of land could enjoin the operations of
the other cotenants. The court announced that the defendant
"had no right to extract the oil without his cotenant's consent,
and could confer no such right upon another [i.e., a lessee]."76
The court then declared that extraction "by one joint tenant, of
oil and gas without the consent of his cotenant, constitutes
waste" and the plaintiff has a remedy of damages.77
The West Virginia court announced in Law u. Heck Oil
~
0 two
. limitations
~
~
on the rule that operations without consent of a cotenant amount to waste. First, a cotenant may be
able to extract oil and gas without consent if the pool is in
danger of dissipation through drainage.7gSecond, a cotenant's
right is also subject to the rights of other cotenants to "compel
partition or sale as provided by statute."80

73. "If a tenant in common, joint tenant, or parcener commit waste, he shall
be liable to his cotenants, jointly or severally, for damages." W. VA. CODE 5 37-7-2
(1966).
74. See supra notes 25, 47, 52 and accompanying text.
75. 78 S.E. 759 (W. Va. 1913).
76. Id. at 761.
77. Id.; see also Williamson v. Jones, 27 S.E. 411, 413 (W. Va. 1897) ('Waste
is an injury to the freehold by one righthlly in possession. This marks the distinction between waste and trespass." Without the consent of the other cotenants, the
defendant was guilty of waste by boring for oil.) (citations omitted); Jeff L. Lewin
et al., Unlocking the Fire: A Proposal for Judicial or Legislative Determination of
the Ownership of Coalbed Methane, 94 W . VA. L. REV.563, 665 (1992).
78. 145 S.E. 601 (W. Va. 1928).
79. Id. The right to act in order to protect the interest from drainage is essentially recognized in every jurisdiction. However, whereas Louisiana requires a
showing of "irreparable harm," West Virginia apparently only requires a showing
that the pool is "being drained away" or that "such drainage will likely occur
through other neighboring wells now drilling." Id.
80. Id.
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It also seems irrelevant how small the cotenant's interest
may be. In Law, the court granted injunctive relief to a plaintiff against the developing defendants, even though the plaintiff
held only a 11768 interest in the oil and gas underlying a tract
of 131%acres. A cotenant, the court stated, sits as "an unqualified owner of real estate or an interest therein [and] is entitled
to have it remain in such condition as he sees fit."''
West Virginia also provides a statute giving a nonconsenting cotenant a right of a~counting.8~
Consequently, a nonconsenting cotenant has two possible causes of action against an
operating cotenant: either an action for waste, in which he can
receive an injunction or damages or both, or an action for accounting wherein he implicitly consents t o the operation and
seeks his just proportion of the net proceeds.

C. Illinois
Early Illinois case law established a clear rule that "one
tenant in common may not operate oil against the protest or
To so
without the consent of the other tenants in ~ornrnon."~~
act would constitute waste and destruction of the property
rights." Indeed, the rule was rather harsh. In essence, it "requires [the cotenants] to agree upon the operation of the land
If the cotenants could not agree, the only
for oil and
remedy was partition."
Eventually, the Illinois courts did develop one exception
from the firm rule that any operation on the land without the
consent of all the cotenants was considered waste. In the context of oil and gas interests, one court held that the "stern rule
of liability of a cotenant, who commits waste or damage t o the
common property, has been relaxed where the profit taken
from the land is of a fugacious nature and liable t o be exhausted by adjacent operators."' Thus, like other states, Illinois
recognized an exception to the waste rule when the land was

81. Id.
82. "An action of account may be maintained . . . by one joint tenant, tenant
in common, or coparcener or his personal representative against the other, or
against the personal representative of the other, for receiving more than his just
share or proportion." W. VA. CODE $ 55-8-13 (1966).
83. Zeigler v. Brenneman, 86 N.E. 597, 600 (Ill. 1908).
84. See 1 KUNIZ,supra note 1, $ 5.4.
85. Zeigler, 86 N.E. at 601.
86. Id.
87. Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 57 N.E.2d 356, 362 (Ill. 1944).
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being drained or in imminent danger of being drained. As
would be expected, the nonconsenting cotenants still had the
right to require an a~counting.~~
A statute was passed in 1939 which codified this common
law rule. It allowed "owners of such majority in interest" t o
drill and remove oil and gas without consent of the minority
cotenants if "the oil or gas is being drained or is in imminent
danger of being drained from such lands by means of wells on
This statute has since been amended, deleting
other lands.7789
the requirement that drainage or imminent danger of drainage
be present. The current statute reads as follows:
When the right to drill for and remove oil and gas from
any lands in this State is owned by joint tenants, or tenants
in common, . . . any one or more of the persons owning a 95
interest or more in the right to drill for and remove the oil
and gas from such lands may be authorized to drill for and
remove oil and gas from such lands in the manner hereinafter
pr~vided.~'

Notice that the right "may be authorized" if the consent of a
majority of cotenants is obtained. The cotenants desiring to
drill must not only get the requisite consent, but also ask "the
court for permission to drill for and remove oil and gas," showing that the removed minerals will be "for the use and benefit
of all the owners of. . . such lands."s1
Like Louisiana, Illinois allows a cotenant t o extract minerals without unanimous consent of the co-owners, so long as a
certain percentage of cotenants do consent. Once a cotenant
meets both the consent requirement and obtains authorization
from the court, he may drill for and extract the oil and gas. A
nonconsenting cotenant is left with the cause of action to require an accounting.

D. Michigan
Although Michigan case law is not nearly as extensive as
that of the states previously discussed, "it is apparent that the
removal of minerals by a cotenant without the consent of the

88. Id.

89.
1945 Ill.
90.
91.

Reward Oil Co. v. White, 77 N.E.2d 436, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948) (quoting
Laws ch. 104, ¶¶ 26, 31).
ILL. ANN. STAT.ch. 765, para. 520/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (emphasis added).
ILL.ANN. STAT.ch. 765, para. 520/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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other cotenants constitutes waste."92In 1942, the state passed
a statute which now governs the right cotenants have t o extract oil and gas. The statute states that,
Tenants in common, joint owners, cotenants or coparceners a s
hold a majority in interest in the title to such lands or the oil
and gas rights in such lands shall be authorized to explore,
drill, mine, develop and operate such lands for oil and gas
mining purposes and remove and transport oil and gas . . . or
store the same on said lands, and sell and dispose of the same
in the manner hereinafter provided."

Although it appears very similar to Illinois's statutory requirem e n t ~the
, ~ ~Michigan statute is significantly different. Recall
that in Illinois, the cotenant is required to fvst show a majority
consent; he is then required to obtain authorization from the
courts. Michigan only requires that the cotenant obtain majority consent. He then "shall" have authority to develop, rather
than "may" develop as in Illinois. However, like the Illinois
statute, the Michigan statute does not require proof that the
land is being drained or in imminent danger of drainage.95

E. An Evaluation of the Minority Rule
Although only four states follow the minority rule, and
each in differing degrees, these,four states do have significant
oil, gas, and other mineral reserves.g6As explained earlier, an
92. 1 KUW, supra note 1, 5 5.4; see also Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 16
N.W.2d 125 (Mich. 1944).
93. MICH. COMP.LAWSANN. $ 319.101(1) (West 1984).
94. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
95. See 2 W.L. SUMMERS,
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 8 222 (1954).
96. A recent Virginia case seems to express the slim possibility that the number of states following the minority rule may become five. The case itself involved
fractional mineral interests, but the mineral involved was coal rather than oil and
gas. Eighty-five percent of the owners wanted to mine, while &en percent did
not. The court defined waste as "[a] destruction or material alteration or deterioration of the freehold . . . by any person rightfully in possession, but who has
not . . . the full estate." Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1988)
1425 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added). Conse(quoting BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
quently, it considered that mining without the consent of all owners constituted
waste. The court wrote, "In the case of tenants in common, no tenant can change
or alter the common property to the injury of his cotenants without their consent.
Injunctive relief against a cotenant is proper where the injury is material, continuing, and not adequately remedied in damages." Id. at 307 (citation omitted).
The dissent claimed that the above rule is "neither required nor justified by
existing Virginia law; moreover, it is not sound in principle or logic." Id. at 309
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas would have the applied the "majority rule
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oil and gas interest has speculative value separate from the
Should not this value be
value of the resources themsel~es.~'
recognized to the same extent as the value obtained by extracting the minerals? Should not a co-owner have an equally strong
right to leave the minerals in the ground as another co-owner%
right to extract them? Moreover, there is esoteric value t o
Louisiana's argument that it seems illogical to allow one person
who has an abstract quota of a mineral interest the right to
take possession of the whole as long as he accounts for profits
in excess of his proportion.
As explained earlier, counterarguments exist.g8Economically and socially, it may be wasteful and unfair to allow one
person with a very small interest to veto the interests of a
much larger group of cotenants. Furthermore, it may be equally
unfair to allow one person holding a fifty-one percent interest,
who is acting completely unreasonably, to veto the reasonable
desires of a large group of persons collectively owning fortynine percent of the mineral interest. But, as mentioned, the
argument is equally legitimate in its reciprocal form.
Perhaps a more equitable and logical rule could exist somewhere in between these two conflicting rules. The balance of
this Comment will propose a model statute which represents
an attempt to address the values promoted by both the majority and minority rules and t o provide cotenants a forum to work
out differences in a rational and reasonable manner.

m.

A MODELSTATUTE
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
OF OIL AND
GAS INTERESTSHEm UNDERJOINT
OWNERSHIP

The substance and procedures contained in this model
statute are drawn from statutes dealing with another interest
in property which shares many similar characteristics with oil
and gas: water rights.ggMany state water codes have elabo-

regarding extraction of oil and gas." Id. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This rule
is the rule that has already been explained above. See supra part 11.
The dissent was convinced that the majority had moved away from prior analysis. Whether the court will continue to move toward the minority view is questionable; however, the language of the majority opinion could easily support the adoption of the minority rule in Virginia.
97. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
98. See supra part 1I.B.
99. Although significant differences certainly exist, similarities between these
two rights, especially in the area of co-ownership, allow water statutes dealing
with co-ownership to provide a useful analogy when dealing with oil and gas

1336 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

rate statutory schemes designed to deal with conflicts that
arise between co-owners. This Comment draws from this material in developing a model statute to deal with similar conflicts
arising between cotenants in oil and gas interests. It should be
noted that the water codes used are drawn from western states
that recognize appropriation, rather than riparian, water
rights. As a result, much of the material that follows would be
inapplicable to riparian states.
I n essence, this model statute establishes a n authorization
process through which a cotenant must go to develop oil and
gas in common property without the consent of all
cot en ant^.'^ Under this model statute, a request for authorization must be either ratified or rejected by the state's oil and
gas administrative agency. Such agencies are already established and fully capable of performing such a task.''' The authorization process includes. six steps: (1) the applicant must
file a request for authorization; (2) the applicant must see that
notice is provided to all cotenants; (3) the state agency reviews
the applicant's request; (4) cotenants are given the opportunity
rights. For example, water interests and oil and gas interests are unique in relation to other property interests because of their tendency not to remain stationary.
ORen, when one speaks of "ownership" of these interests, the term only implies a
right to use or extract them. Once they are captured, then a more common conno& PAULINE
M. SIMMONS,
tation of ownership is enjoyed. See 2 OWEN L. ANDERSON
WATERSAND WATERRIGHTS8 16.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (discussing water
,
note 1, 8 2.4. Furthermore, because good water, oil, and
rights); 1 K u N ~ supra
gas are all very valuable, conflicts easily arise between people who share common
ownership interests in the same quantity.
100. See infia Appendix, MODELSTATUTE:DEVELOPMENT
OF OIL AND GAS
RIGHTSHELDUNDERJOINT
OWNERSHIP 8 1-1-01 [hereinafter MODELSTATUTE].
101. In most oil and gas states, elaborate administrative agencies oversee the
oil and gas production within the state. These agencies generally focus on environmental and conservation issues, and are often preoccupied with pooling and unitization orders and procedures. Because these agencies are fully operating, having
them oversee these rather simple proceedings would be no trouble. For some examples of statutes establishing, outlining, and governing these agencies, see the following:
Alabama: ALA. CODE8 9-17-3 (1987 & Supp. 1993);
Alaska: ALASKASTAT. §$ 31.05.005, 31.05.030 (1985);
Arkansas: ARK. CODEANN. $8 15-71-101, 15-71-106, 15-71-111 (Michie 1987 &
Supp. 1991);
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT.ANN. $8 353.530, 353.565 (Michie 1993);
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 30:1, 30:6 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993);
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. $8 53-1-5, 53-1-7, 53-1-17 (1972 & Supp. 1992);
Montana: MONT.CODEANN. $8 82-10-101, 82-11-111, 82-11-144 (1992);
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE$8 38-08-04, 38-08-09.2 (1987 & Supp. 1993);
Utah: UTAH CODEANN. 8 40-6-4 (1993);
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE§$ 22-8-4, 22-8-11 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
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to protest the request; (5) the state agency makes its administrative decision certifying or denying the request; and (6) either
the requesting or a protesting party must be given the right to
appeal that decision. Each of these steps will now be discussed.

A. Filing a Request for Authorization
When seeking an allocation or transfer of water rights in
an appropriation state, the first step a party undertakes is the
filing of an application for transfer with the state administrative agency.lo2Likewise, the first step a cotenant should take
when attempting to develop the common property is to file a
request for authorization with the state oil and gas agency.lo3
The request form, provided by the agency, should not be complex and should require that three factors be shown, although
more could be required if the state feels additional information
is necessary.
First, the cotenant should show evidence of his interest in
the land and describe its extent.'* Second, the cotenant
should show that procedures t o notify the other cotenants are
underway. The cotenant should be able to provide a list of all
other oil and gas interest holders in land, with their addresses.
If some cotenants are unknown or cannot be found, the cotenant would need to show that reasonable efforts have been made
t o locate these ~otenants.'~~
Third, the cotenant should show
that he has obtained the consent of a certain percentage of the
other cotenants. The model statute suggests that the required
consent should come from at least sixty-five percent of the
interest in the land and at least a majority of the cotenants
themselves, without regard to the amount of interest they
hold. lo6
102. See generally 2 ANDERSON
& SIMMONS,
supra note 99, 8 16.01(c); B o ~ i e
G. Colby et al., Procedural Aspects of State Water Law: Transferring Water Rights
in the Western States, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 697, 697-706 (1989).
103. Infra app., MODELSTATUTE 8 1-1-02(1).
104. Infra app., MODELSTATUTE 8 1-1-02(l)(a).
105. Infra app., MODELSTATUTE 8 1-1-02(1Xb).
106. Infra app., MODELSTATUTE 8 1-1-02(1Xc). Perhaps some examples would
explain this requirement more clearly. Assume that a cotenant held 75% of a mineral interest and the remaining 25% was split among three people. If the majority
tenant wanted to develop, he has already met the fvst prong because more than
65% of the interest is represented. However, he would have to convince at least
two other cotenants and obtain their consent before he could a d . If only two people shared the remaining 25%, then he would only have to obtain the consent of
one.
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Requiring this two-tiered consent would serve several purposes. Initially, although not as restrictive as the Louisianalo7
or West Virginia statutes,lo8 it does give minority interest
holders much more protection than they receive under the
majority rule. For example, if one cotenant has a large interest,
he cannot bully the cotenants with smaller interests since he
needs a majority consent to act. Likewise, a cotenant (or a
group of cotenants) with very small interests cannot force the
cotenants with larger percentages to develop the land until
they have the consent of persons who together hold over 65% of
the interest.
Requiring both a percentage of the mineral interest and a
majority of interest holders is a fair method of protecting both
cotenants who own a substantial portion of the mineral interest
and cotenants who hold much smaller percentages. It is reasonable that if a majority of interest holders want to develop or
not develop, their voice should rule. However, it would be unfair for a majority of cotenants, together owning less than 5%,
to control the common property's development when the minority cotenants own the remaining 95%. This two-tiered consent
requirement would fairly compensate for both situations. Although the Model Statute sets the requirements a t 65% of the
interest and a majority of the cotenants, individual states could
set these standards at whatever level each thinks is most equitable.

B. Notice to Fellow Cotenants
In the water transfer process, the next step after filing the
application is to publish notice alerting other water right holders of the potential transfer.lo9 Although a n applicant for a
water transfer would give public notice, generally in a newspaper, a cotenant seeking authorization to drill should instead be
required to give notice to other cotenants by certified mail.110

Now assume that one cotenant held 30% and nine others had equal shares of
the remaining 70% of the interest. For any one of the minority interest holders to
develop, he could either get the consent of the majority holder and four other minority holders, or of the remaining eight minority holders.
107. See supra part IIIA.
108. See supra part 1II.B.
109. See ARE. REV. STAT.ANN. 9 45-172(7) (1987); NEV.REV. STAT.9 533.095
(1992); UTAHCODE ANN. § 73-3-6 (1989).
110. Infia app., MODELSTATUTE
5 1-1-03(2).
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This notice should contain two items. First, the notice
should describe in sufficient detail the operations that the consenting cotenants propose to perform."' Any lessees involved
should be listed. The standard defining "sufficient detail"
should be determined by the state agency. At a minimum, the
notice should describe all proposed operations, dates, geographical locations, and all other relevant information.
Second, the notice should announce that any cotenant
protesting this proposed activity shall be given an opportunity
to be heard.ll2 A protesting cotenant will be provided an informal hearing with the oil and gas commission and other interested cotenants. The protesting cotenant should be provided
with all relevant information about protest procedures, including the time limit in which the protest must be filed, the location where the protest must be filed, and the information that
the protest should in~lude."~

C. Review by the State Agency
The initial review of the request for authorization by the
state agency should be brief. Essentially, the state agency
should make three determinations.'" First, the agency
should make sure that the cotenant filing the request and all
those consenting have legitimate interests in the land. All the
information needed to make this decision should be filed with
the request. Second, the agency should make sure that the twotiered consent requirement is met. Third, the agency should
decide whether the proposed operations seeking to be authorized are reasonable.'15 If any of these three elements is not
met, the request should be denied, with immediate notification
of such denial sent to the requesting cotenant. This notscation
should contain a brief statement explaining why the request
was denied.'16 If all elements are met and the request passes

111. I@a app., MODELSTATUTE
3 1-1-03(l)(a).
112. Infra app., MODEL
STATUTE 3 1-1-03(i)(c).
STATUTE 3 1-1-03(1Xd).
113. Infra app., MODEL
STATUTE 3 1-1-04.
114. 1nfi.a app., MODEL
115. It is encouraged that this be a very minimal standard of reasonableness.
It is tempting to simply have a rational standard, but "reasonable" seems to offer
a little more bite, and if the proposed operations are completely unreasonable, the
agency should save everyone a lot of time .and deny the request. However, it would
be expected that very few requests would be denied because they are unreasonable.
STATUTE3 1-1-04(3).
116. I@a app., MODEL
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the initial agency review, it will receive a presumption of validity.11'

D. Protest
In a procedure to transfer water rights, after notice is
given, interested parties are given a certain amount of time to
file protests.'18 The Model Statute has incorporated a similar
provi~ion."~
The time limit to protest a proposed transfer of
water rights generally begins on the last day of public notice
and can range from ten days to thirty days, or whatever is
posted in the public notice.120 In a request for an oil and gas
authorization proceeding, this time period should begin individually on the date each cotenant receives notice through certified mail. States should set the time limit according to their
respective policies and circumstances, always giving reasonable
time t o nonconsenting cotenants t o react to the proposal. However, the time limit should not be so long that it stifles or is
detrimental to the efficiency of the authorization process.
In order to rebut the presumption of validity created after
a request passes the initial agency review, the protesting cotenant should state specific facts showing why the proposed operations are not reasonable.l2' The agency should then review
the protest. If it determines that the protest is legitimate, proceedings should be instigated to resolve the protest.
1. Informal versus formal resolution

Because a protest tends to increase the cost and amount of
time necessary to authorize or deny the request, informal proceedings should be utilized to their fullest extent.'" In water
117. I e a app., MODELSTATUTE
$ 1-1-04(4).
& SIMMONS,
supra note 99, $ 16.01(c); Colby et al., su118. See 2 ANDERSON
pra note 102, at 703.
119. Infia app., MODELSTATUTE8 1-1-05(1).
120. See Colby et al., supra note 102, a t 717 tbl. 2.
121. Infra app., MODELSTATUTE
$ 1-1-05(2Xb). The protesting party may rebut
the presumption of validity by attacking any one of the three findings the state
agency must initially make. See supra part 1V.C. However, the first two prongs
should generally not be rebuttable because the state agency will have already verified whether or not they are met. Therefore, the third prong, finding whether the
proposed application is reasonable, should (if the agency is doing its job) be the
only finding that could be attacked.
122. Commentators have noted that when protests are Ned in water transfer
proceedings, the process enters into a "critical and costly part" which can significantly delay the process. Colby et al., supm note 102, at 703. For a detailed analy-
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transfers, "informal hearings are preferred by the State Engineer, the applicants and the protestors. Informal proceedings
encourage openness in which the parties state their positions in
dialogue form."lB
Because "informal" resolution of conflicts is generally "the
least expensive and swiftest'' means to resolve protests,lZ4the
Model Statute provides only for informal proceedings in which
a protester has a forum t o present his arguments on why the
proposed action should not be allowed.'* These informal proceedings should be conducted by the state agency and governed
by the state administrative procedure act.
2. Burden of proof

As mentioned, the requesting cotenant should have an
initial burden of proof of showing three items in his request for
authori~ation.'~~
Once this initial burden is met, the request
should be presumed to be valid. The protesting cotenant should
then have the burden of proof to state specific facts showing
why the proposal is ~nreasonable.'~'If the protester does produce evidence demonstrating that the proposal is not reasonable and should not be authorized, the requesting cotenant may
rebut that evidence. However, in the end, the protesting party
Because of
should always have the burden of persua~ion.'~~
the fairly high consent requirements a cotenant must initially
pass, a protesting cotenant should provide a convincing case to
obtain a denial of the request.

E. The State Agency's Decision
After a request for authorization is filed, and either the
time for protest has passed with no protests filed, or after an
informal hearing has been conducted, the state agency should
give an authorization or denial of the request. If the request
has passed the initial agency review, and no protests have been
sis on the effect of protests on the water transfer process, see 1 LAWRENCE
J.
MACDONNELL,
THE WATERTRANSFERPROCESSAS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR
MEETINGCHANGING
WATERDEMANDS46-48 (1990).
123. Ray J. Davis, Utah Water Rights Transfer Law, 31 A m . L. REV.841, 854
(1989).
124. Colby et al., supra note 102, at 704.
125. Ifia app., MODELSTATUTE $ 1-1-05(2)(b).
126. See supra part IVA.
127. See supra note 121.
128. See infia app., MODELSTATUTE$ 1-1-05(2)(b).
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filed, it should be authorized. A similar result should occur if a
nonconsenting cotenant cannot convince the agency that the
request is unrea~onable.'~~
Furthermore, if the cotenant can show that the land is
being drained or is in imminent danger of being drained, the
request to drill should be per se rea~onable.'~~

F. Review of the State Agency's Decision
Any party involved in an informal hearing may appeal the
agency's deci~ion.'~'This appeal may either be to the judiciary o r within the administrative system, whichever is provided
for in the state's administrative procedure statutes. In water
transfer proceedings, the time a party is allowed to prepare an
appeal ranges from ffieen to thirty-five days.ls2 The time
limit should allow the appellant a reasonable time to prepare
an appeal, but should be short enough for review while the
facts are fresh.
Because the state agency is specially trained in dealing
with oil and gas issues, the reviewing body should use the
abuse of discretion standard rather than perform a de novo
hearing.lss In relation to water transfer hearings, Schuh v.
State Department of ~ c o l o g y ' lrecognized that "due deference
must given 'to the specialized knowledge and expertise of the
administrative agency.' Here, the [state agency] is in a far
better position to judge what is in the public interest regarding
water permits than a c o ~ r t . " ' Many
~
other states have expressed similar views.'= Proceedings performed by the state
oil and gas agency should receive similar deference.
The reviewing body should answer three questions: "[Flirst,
did the agency act within the scope of its delegated authority;
second, did the agency employ fair procedures; and third, was
129. See supra note 121.
130. Infia app., MODELSTATUTE Q 1-1-04(3).
131. Infia app., MODELSTATUTE 8 1-1-M(1).
132. See Colby et al., supra note 102, a t 719 tbl. 4.
133. Infia app., MODELSTATUTE 9 1-1-M(2).
134. 667 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1983).
135. Id. at 68 (quoting English Bay Enters. Ltd. v. Island County, 568 P.2d
783, 786 (Wash. 1977)).
136. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 731 (Cal.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); In re Change of Appmpriation Water Rights, 816
P.2d 1054, 1060 (Mont. 1991); In re Applications T-61 & T-62, 440 N.W.2d 466,
470 (Neb. 1989); Revert v. Ray, 603 P.2d 262, 264 (Nev. 1979); Wyoming State
Eng'r v. Willadsen, 792 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Wyo. 1990).
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the agency action reasonable."13' When answering the third
question, the reviewing body should only look for abuse of discretion and "not substitute its independent policy judgment."'" It should uphold the agency's action "unless the action is arbitrary, capricious, o r lacking in evidentiary support."lsg

As the law currently stands, a state has only two fairly
rigid rules to choose from when presented with the issue of a
cotenant developing the common property without the consent
of the other cotenants. The majority rule strongly favors the
cotenant desiring to develop, essentially giving him an unqualified right to extract the oil, notwithstanding the other
cotenants' desires. On the other hand, the minority rule similarly favors the nonconsenting party. Neither rule has a safety
valve to protect against unreasonable behavior by either group
of cotenants, and neither rule recognizes that oil and gas interests are often valued in different ways.
This Comment proposes a possible solution. The significant
number of cases discussing this issue shows that the problem is
a difficult one. This middle-of-the-road approach gives minority
cotenants some say in how the common property should be
developed, but not an overriding veto. However, after the consent requirements are met, the reasonable aspirations of a
majority of cotenants and super-majority of the actual interest
should be enabled to proceed.
Curtis Anderson

137.
176 (Ct.
Comm'n,
138.
139.

United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161,
App. 1986) (quoting California Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Industrial Welfare
599 P.2d 31 (Cal. 1979)).
Id.
Id.
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DEVELOPMENT
OF OIL AND GASRIGHTS HELD
UNDER JOINT OWNERSHIP

1-1-01 Purpose of the Statute
The purpose of this model statute is to address the needs of both
minority and majority interests in oil and gas rights under joint ownership. This statute seeks to protect both interests by providing requirements a cotenant must meet before he or she can develop the
common property without full consent of all cotenants, and by providing a forum in which protesting cotenants may present opposing
arguments against development. All applications and hearings will be
brought before the State Oil and Gas Agency.
1-1-02 Application for Authorization of the Proposed Development
(1) An application for the development of oil and gas interests
held in joint ownership must be filed with the State Agency. Such
application shall be upon forms furnished by the State Agency and
shall provide the following:
(a) The cotenant shall provide evidence of his or her interest
in the land and adequately describe its extent.
(b) The cotenant shall show that procedures to notify all
other cotenants are underway. To fblfil this requirement, the
cotenant need only show that the cotenants owning oil and gas
interests, not surface interests, are being notified. If some
cotenants are unknown or cannot be found, the cotenant must
show that reasonable efforts have been exerted to locate these
cotenants.
(c) The cotenant must obtain the consent of:
(i) a t least sixty-five percent (65%) of the oil and gas
interests in the land; and
(ii) a majority of the cotenants themselves, without
regard to the amount of interest they hold.
(2) The cotenant shall provide adequate evidence and documentation which allows the State Agency to verify each element in subsection (1).
(3) The State Agency may require an application fee to
accompany the application.
1-1-03

Notice to Fellow Cotenants

(1) The applicant shall give all other cotenants, to the extent

possible, notice of the proposed development. The notice shall provide:
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(a) a description sufficiently detailing what operations the
applicant (and those consenting) proposes to perform, including
dates, geographical locations, and other relevant information;
(b) a list of all lessees involved or potentially involved;
(c) an announcement that any cotenant protesting this action shall be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) an announcement that a cotenant wishing to protest
shall be given all relevant information about protest procedures,
including the time limit to file a protest, the information the
protest should include, and any costs.
(2) All notice shall be provided by certified mail.
1-1-04 Review by the State Agency
(1)Approval of the State Agency is required for any development
of oil and gas interests held in joint ownership.
(2) The agency shall determine whether the applicant has met
all the requirements listed in section 1-1-02.
(3) The agency shall then determine whether the proposed development is reasonable.
(4) If the application passes subsections (2) and (3), it shall then
be given a presumption of validity.
(5) If the application fails any requirement in section 1-1-02 or is
found to be an unreasonable proposal, it shall be denied.
(6) The state agency shall notify the applicant as to its finding
under subsection (4) or (5). If the agency denies the application, i t
shall provide a brief statement explaining the reason(s) why the application was denied.
1-1-05 Protest
(1) Any cotenant desiring to protest an application for development of oil and gas interests shall file notice with the State Agency
within (2
working days following the date the cotenant was notified by certified mail. The State Agency must fully consider the evidence provided by such person during the review of the application.
(2) The applicant has the initial burden of showing the requirements in section 1-1-02 and that the proposal is reasonable.
(a) The agency should carry out investigations to confirm or
rebut the evidence presented by the applicant if necessary.
(b) If the applicant has met this initial burden, a presumption is created in his or her favor. If a protesting party presents
evidence sufficient to rebut any element required to be shown by
the applicant, the agency should conduct a hearing to resolve the
conflict. Informal procedures must be exhausted before formal
procedures are instituted. The burden of persuasion will be on
the protesting party.
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(c) Informal hearings shall be governed by the State Administrative Procedure Act.
(3) If informal procedures are used, after each protesting cotena n t has had a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the State Agency
shall either authorize or deny the application.

1-1-06 Review of the Agency Decision
(1)Any party involved in an informal hearing may appeal the
State Agency's decision. Such appeals will be conducted according to
the State Administrative Procedure Act.
(2) The reviewing body shall apply an arbitrary and capricious or
an abuse of discretion standard to the agency's decision. Because the
agency is specially trained in dealing with oil and gas issues, i t
should be accorded a high degree of deference.

